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Socrates and Maimonides are paragons of piety. They devote their lives 
to divine service, notwithstanding their perception that an unbridgeable 
chasm separates the divine from the human. At great personal cost they take 
on God’s tasks—that is, the tasks that God would do if only He weren’t 
God. For Socrates, that work is to persuade people of the great value of their 
souls and consequently of the importance of justice and truth. For Maimo-
nides, it is to encourage meticulous observance of Jewish law in its ritual 
and moral aspects, and to banish false and noxious views of God from the 
beliefs of even ordinary people. Neither Socrates nor Maimonides is content 
to foster only his own intellectual perfection—and therein lies their piety.
What might it mean for a human being to be pious if he does not hold 
a conventional conception of God—indeed, if he has no firm belief 
in God at all? The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues is, for all his god-talk, 
no ordinary believer. And Maimonides, his protestations of orthodoxy 
notwithstanding, believes in a God who neither hears nor sees, neither 
rewards nor punishes, neither judges nor forgives. yet, these two men 
are in their way paragons of piety. For each serves God by serving his 
fellow man.
Both Socrates and Maimonides devote themselves to the care of oth-
ers, selflessly and at no small cost to themselves. Socrates, as he tells 
us in the Apology (31b), goes to each Athenian privately, “as a father 
or an older brother might do,” persuading him to care for virtue, all 
the while making himself so hated that he is indicted, convicted, and 
executed.1 Maimonides, who longs to be with God, to meditate upon 
Him, to know Him, to love Him with the full force of his intellect, 
nevertheless composes voluminous works not for himself but for those 
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who need his guidance:  “A man endowed with knowledge,” he says, 
“does not set anything down for himself in order to teach himself what 
he already knows” (Guide of the Perplexed 2.37: 375).2
It would seem that what motivates both Socrates and Maimonides 
to care for the souls of others at great personal cost is a kind of piety. 
For, on the one hand, helping others seems to go beyond the call of jus-
tice:  what justice ostensibly requires of people is that they refrain from 
harming others (see Ap. 37b–c, 41d–e; Crito 49a–e; Rep. 1.335a–e).3 
yet, on the other hand, it would be difficult to think of a more fruit-
ful way to serve God than by serving man. For if there is a God, what 
does He need? What could we human beings give Him that would 
be a fair exchange for all the bounties we enjoy? These are questions 
that occupy the last part of Plato’s Euthyphro. But is it Euthyphro the 
piety expert, the man who is privy to amazing stories about the gods, 
who can teach us how to serve them? Is it he who can say what kind of 
service (hupēretikē) to the gods holiness is?  Is it he who can specify the 
work that men assist the gods in accomplishing on earth?  Euthyphro 
is unable to name that work because it has no place in his narrowly 
self-centered conception of piety: the only work that is of concern to 
him is that of pleasing the gods in hopes of securing their favor. It is 
Socrates who can readily identify the work that is holiness, for this 
work is none other than the divine service that occupies him daily: 
the admonishment, examination, and exhortation of his fellow men to 
care for truth, justice, and the condition of their souls.
Maimonides is no different. He, too, labors for the whole of his life 
to help others come to embrace correct beliefs about God and to ob-
serve the Torah’s laws properly. He endures criticisms from all sides 
even as he persists in serving as advisor on matters of  Jewish practice. 
Why? What is it that motivates these two men, and how is that motiva-
tion to be construed as a pious one?
I shall argue that what both Socrates and Maimonides realize is that 
there is no God who can do on earth the work that men can do. Who 
but men can encourage other men to live worthy lives? Who but men 
will see and hear, reward and punish, judge and forgive? If God has 
not “forsaken the earth” (Ezek. 9:9), it is only because there are hu-
Roslyn Weiss 143
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007
man beings to do “in the earth” (Jer. 9:23) what God cannot do Him-
self. Whether there is no God or whether there is a self-contained and 
therefore unengaged God, His work must be done. In helping others, 
then, the pious man does not imitate God; on the contrary, the pious 
man extends God’s reach by becoming His outstretched arm.
Does Socrates believe in gods?
Two charges are brought against Socrates: (1) that he corrupts the 
young, and (2) that he is impious—specifically, that he does not believe 
in the gods of the city but in novel daimonic things (Ap. 24b9–c1).  He 
can defend himself only indirectly against the second charge, since he 
cannot (without outright lying) affirm his belief in traditional Greek 
gods. His strategy takes two tacks. one tack, the more evident of the 
two, involves his provoking his accuser Meletus into exaggerating the 
first part of the impiety charge—that Socrates does not believe in the 
gods of the city—to one of full-blown atheism, and then to use the 
second part of the charge—that Socrates believes in novel daimonic 
things—to refute the newly inflated first part: if a daimon is a god 
or a child of a god, then how can Socrates believe in daimons yet not 
in gods? This first argument is largely ad hominem, exposing Meletus 
as someone who has given but scant thought to the grave charges he 
brings. It no doubt does little to convince the jurors that Socrates is in-
nocent. It is the second tack, the more subtle one, that constitutes the 
positive case Socrates makes for his claim of innocence. This second 
tack is itself a dual one. It consists, first, of Socrates’ relentless citing 
throughout his trial (that is, throughout Plato’s fictionalized account of 
his trial in the Apology) of “the god”—the god at Delphi who is witness 
to his “wisdom;” the god whose mission he is carrying out; the god to 
whom he is so devoted that he lives in dire poverty; the god who sta-
tioned him, ordering him to philosophize and to examine himself and 
others; the god whom he obeys over the men of Athens; the god whom 
he serves and whose orders he follows; the god whose gift to Athens he 
is; the god who set him upon the city as a gadfly upon a horse; the god 
who ordered him through oracles and dreams to practice philosophy; 
the gods before whom the judges have sworn an oath; the god behind 
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the daimonion, Socrates’ divine sign; the gods who are not without 
care for a good man’s troubles; the god who alone knows whether it 
is better to live or die. To be sure, this rhetorical trope was devised to 
counteract the impression, seared into the Athenian consciousness by 
publicly staged caricature as well as by perniciously pervasive gossip, 
of Socrates as an impious man. At the same time, however, it presents 
Socrates’ devotion to the god as inextricably interwoven with his devo-
tion to his fellow man.
Second, Socrates points to his personal justice. Socrates is pious, not 
because he receives and obeys private communications from a super-
natural source but because, even at the cost of his life, he does what 
is right. He will not be party to an illegal mass trial; he will not arrest 
Leon of Salamis and condemn him to death. Socrates will not even 
behave in court as other men do, begging and crying and parading his 
children before the jurors. His refusal to subvert justice in this way and 
to involve the jurors in such subversion is his proof that he believes in 
gods. But he believes, as he says, “as none of my accusers does” (Ap. 
35d7). Socratic piety is far removed from its conventional counter-
part.
The Socratic conception of piety has, then, two components. on 
the one hand, it requires that one be just or refuse to commit injus-
tice. This is piety’s necessary condition, its sine qua non. It is also its 
essentially negative aspect. It is because piety has this negative aspect 
that Socrates believes that those judges who would pervert justice by 
doling out favors to defendants whose emotional pleas they find grati-
fying cannot be pious, no matter how orthodox their views of the gods 
or how punctilious their ritual practice. on the other hand, however, 
piety goes beyond justice by requiring service to the god through help-
ing others: this is its positive aspect. In the Euthyphro, where Socrates 
explicitly distinguishes piety from justice, Socrates encourages his in-
terlocutor to think of piety in terms of the service human beings might 
render to the gods, the work with which they might promote the gods’ 
agenda—on earth.  
on both counts, Socrates qualifies as pious. There can be no doubt 
that he regards himself as just. When he says, for example, that he 
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never did injustice to anyone and therefore will not do it to himself 
(Ap. 37b), or that if he is brought before a court, “some base man will 
be my prosecutor—for no worthwhile person would prosecute a hu-
man being who does no injustice” (Gorg. 521d), it is his justness to 
which he refers. But he clearly also sees himself as going beyond the 
strict demands of justice. For when he talks about tending to the souls 
of others and fighting for the cause of justice (justice being, in his view, 
the sole guarantor of genuine human happiness), he almost invariably 
makes reference to his serving the gods.4
What sort of god does Socrates believe in? The god of whom Soc-
rates speaks in the Apology is surely not simply one of the many gods 
whose existence Meletus suspects him of denying. Although this god 
is at first assimilated to the god of the oracle at Delphi, Apollo is never 
mentioned by name and, as the dialogue progresses, all association be-
tween Socrates’ god and a god of known identity dissolves. Socrates’ 
god sends him to Athens out of concern for Athenian souls; the task 
to which the god assigns Socrates is one of exhorting his fellow citizens 
to care for virtue and truth, disabusing them of their false conceit of 
wisdom, and encouraging them to engage in self-examination. Socra-
tes’ god is, then, one who promotes—through Socrates—justice and 
philosophy. Moreover, if to obey the god is to practice philosophy, 
then to obey the god is to guide one’s conduct by one’s own reasoned 
determination of what is most just. A god who commands men to 
philosophize does not serve as an alternative or even as a supplement to 
human reason as a guide to moral decision-making; instead, such a god 
mandates that human reason is to be one’s guide.5 Insofar as Socrates’ 
god demands of men that they live philosophically, and insofar as the 
station at which the god places Socrates is philosophy, it follows that to 
do as the god demands is to think for oneself. one can reasonably say, 
then, that Socrates’ god renders himself superfluous.
What kind of God does Maimonides believe in?
Maimonides, nearly all agree, believes in an Arabic Aristotelian God.6 
The agreement, however, ends there. For in the view of many Maimo-
nidean scholars, Maimonides, at the same time that he embraces an 
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Aristotelian God, also acknowledges a God who created the world, 
who intervenes in the natural order by way of miracles, who bestows 
prophecy—or at least can on occasion withhold it (see Guide 2.32)—
and whose providence extends to His human creatures.
My strong suspicion, however, is that Maimonides’ God did not cre-
ate the world (although He is the eternal cause of the eternal universe), 
does not perform miracles, does not bestow or withhold prophecy, 
and is not providential with respect to individual human beings. In 
other words, I suspect that Maimonides’ views are identical with those 
he attributes to Aristotle in the Guide. Not surprisingly, Maimonides 
finds it necessary to conceal views that would strike many in the Jewish 
world as heretical—indeed, Maimonides labels as heretical several of 
the opinions he very likely secretly endorses 7—but he provides enough 
hints to make it known that his true sympathies lie with Aristotle. 
The only significant difference—and it is certainly a most important 
one—between Maimonides’ view and Aristotle’s is that Maimonides 
regards the Aristotelian God as one supremely worthy of worship and 
devotion.
I begin with several methodological points.  First, Maimonides makes 
it clear in the Introduction to the Guide of the Perplexed (11) that the 
Torah is not to be read literally except with respect to its precepts, 
the affirmative and negative directives that constitute the 613 bibli-
cal commandments. Second, Maimonides disparages arguments that 
are designed to ensure a desired conclusion; he regards as worthwhile 
only those arguments that proceed from the way things are observed to 
be—that is, not from how one might wish they are but from how they 
are. Third, Maimonides does not mean everything he says.
With regard to the first point, Maimonides sees the extra-legal mate-
rial in the Torah as “parables.” The final metaphor he cites (Introduc-
tion:  11–12) to capture the relationship between the external or literal 
meaning of the text and its inner, deeper meaning is the one he quotes 
approvingly from Proverbs 11.25: “A word fitly spoken is like apples of 
gold in settings of silver filigree.” 8
Maimonides’ praise of this final metaphor makes it appear as if he 
values highly the literal meaning of the text, which, as he goes on to 
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say, is as beautiful as silver. Moreover, his contention that the Torah’s 
literal sense contains within itself something that “indicates to some-
one considering it what is to be found in its internal meaning” suggests 
that he ascribes to the Torah’s literal sense not only intrinsic value (its 
beauty) but instrumental value as well: not only are the settings of 
silver filigree beautiful in their own right but they point beyond them-
selves to the golden apples within.
As Maimonides proceeds, however, he remarks that when one looks 
at the apple from afar or without devoting to it perfect attention, one 
thinks it is made of silver; only someone who has a sharp eye and who 
devotes to the apple his full attention sees what is inside the silver fili-
gree, namely, an apple of gold. The clear implication of Maimonides’ 
words is that the literal text actually deceives those who do not have 
keen vision, hiding the text’s real meaning. We note, moreover, that 
the filigree is in fact of no help to anyone in discovering the golden 
apple within: the only way to see the golden apple is to disregard the 
filigree, to look not at it but through its apertures. How, then, can it 
be supposed that the Torah’s literal text helps one to penetrate through 
to the Torah’s truths?
If the literal meaning of the Torah’s text is not after all useful for 
discerning the Torah’s true meaning, why does Maimonides assign to 
it the value of silver? Does he not indicate thereby that the literal text 
has considerable intrinsic value, even if not quite the same value as the 
inner truth it conceals? Indeed, he does. The value the literal text has 
is, as he says, “political”: it enhances human social and political associa-
tions and improves moral character (12). It is these political benefits 
that make the literal sense of the Torah beautiful in its own way, as 
beautiful as silver.9  
With respect to truth, however, the silver casing has no real worth; 
only the golden apple is beautiful. Twice in the Introduction (6, 14), 
Maimonides says that it is not necessary to understand the meaning of 
the Torah’s “parables,” that is, of the Torah’s literal stories and accounts; 
all that one need do is recognize that the parables are parables. Simply 
knowing that the literal accounts in the Torah are parables is, Maimo-
nides says, like having a screen removed between the eye and a visible 
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thing. Because the literal meaning hinders the apprehension of truth, 
it is a screen to be removed. From the point of view of truth, it is not 
only useless but obstructive.10
The second methodological point, developed by Maimonides at con-
siderable length in Guide 1.71, suggests that a position should not 
be adopted simply in order to avoid an awkward or even blasphe-
mous truth. Maimonides berates those who “did not conform in their 
premises to the appearance of that which exists, but considered how 
being ought to be in order that it should furnish a proof for the correct-
ness of a particular opinion, or at least should not refute it” (178). He 
also quotes approvingly the following statement by Themistius: “That 
which exists does not conform to the various opinions, but rather the 
correct opinions conform to that which exists” (179).
Third, Maimonides exercises great caution in determining what to say 
and what to suppress, apparently taking to heart the Sage Avtalyon’s ad-
monition to his colleagues:  “Sages, mind your words!” (Mishnah Avot 
2005 [hereafter Avot] 1.3).11 In his Commentary to Sanhedrin 10 (see 
Maimonides 1981), Maimonides identifies the target of this warning 
as Antigonos Ish Sokho, who famously said: “Do not be like servants 
who serve the master for the sake of reward; rather be like servants who 
serve the master not for the sake of reward” (Avot 1.11).  Maimonides 
exhibits here his sensitivity to the ill-advisedness of telling the masses 
things they are neither intellectually nor spiritually prepared to hear: 
could it not happen that, as a consequence of their being told that they 
should worship God not for the sake of reward, they would cease to 
worship God altogether?12
Maimonides emphasizes in his Introduction to the Guide that not 
every truth may be taught to everyone. He thus warns the reader that 
his text will proceed by “revealing and concealing” (6–7, 18): on oc-
casion he will deliberately contradict himself (20); also, his views will 
not be understood correctly until all the statements he makes on a 
given topic (often only in what he calls “chapter headings”) are gath-
ered together from all the scattered places where he discusses it (6). 
Moreover, it is clear that Maimonides espouses views to which he does 
not subscribe. These are views that he characterizes much later on in 
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the Guide, at 3.28, as necessary though not true.13
It seems safe to say, then, that Maimonides does not always mean what 
he says. For that reason one has to be inordinately cautious and patient 
before concluding that one has discerned Maimonides’ position. Let 
us consider briefly two issues—creation and divine providence—where 
Maimonides denies vociferously that he shares the Aristotelian view, 
but where many have suspected that he is merely concealing his agree-
ment with it. In both cases I shall have recourse to one or more of the 
methodological points just discussed.
In Guide 2.25 Maimonides proclaims and defends his belief that the 
world was created (see also: 1.71, 2.6, 2.13, 3.10).14 There are, how-
ever, many reasons—two of which strike me as absolutely decisive—to 
doubt the sincerity of Maimonides’ claim. First, Maimonides argues 
that, in the absence of a demonstration to the contrary, the words of 
the Torah are to be taken literally. yet, as we have seen, Maimonides 
supposes that the Torah is not to be read literally except with respect to 
matters of law (Introduction: 11; also:  2.17: 298, 2.27: 333); much of 
the rest of it is, as he says, a parable.15 Indeed, he says explicitly that the 
creation story (which he calls “the Account of the Beginning”) is a par-
able (Introduction: 7, 9). Second—and here, too, only in the absence 
of a demonstration—he would have us prefer the creation view on the 
grounds that the Aristotelian eternity view threatens the very founda-
tions of the Torah. yet, as we have seen, Maimonides rails (in 1.71) 
against those who argue tendentiously, having their conclusion in hand 
before their argument begins.16 For Maimonides no view that is true 
threatens the foundations of the Torah. Since the Torah, too, is true, its 
deeper view necessarily concurs with philosophical truth:  one has only 
to interpret the Torah correctly—that is, figuratively—in order to dis-
close that truth. Indeed, were it not for philosophical truth, one would 
hardly know how to begin to interpret Scripture correctly, how to dis-
cern its hidden truths. For the secrets of the Torah, its golden apples, 
are none other than the truths of philosophy, the truths that Aristotle 
(as Maimonides understood him) attained by the light of reason.
Which “foundation of the Torah” does an eternal universe threaten? 
It threatens the possibility of miracles.  And what is so important about 
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miracles?  That they sustain our hopes and fears (2.25: 328). Without 
creation there can be no miracles, and without miracles, there can be 
nothing to hope for or to fear. Maimonides believes, of course, that the 
philosopher, the superior human being, lives beyond hope and fear (see 
his Code, Laws concerning Repentance, 10.1, 10.3). He believes, too, that 
Abraham, in being prepared to sacrifice his son Isaac, acts out of love, 
“without hope of reward or fear of punishment, and [in the recogni-
tion] that love and fear of God is alone the right motivation for action” 
(Guide 3.24).17 It is only the masses who require hope and fear in order 
to conduct themselves properly—indeed Maimonides explicitly permits 
them to worship God out of hope and fear even though this is hardly 
ideal (Code, Laws concerning Repentance, 10.5)—and so it is only they 
who need miracles and only they who need creation. Creation is the 
silver filigree that conceals the golden apple of the universe’s eternity. It 
is silver because it sustains a belief that enhances the moral, social, and 
political life of ordinary people; but it is not gold—it is not true.18
If we turn to providence, here, too, we find Maimonides distanc-
ing himself from the Aristotelian position according to which divine 
providence keeps the world-order as it is, preserving both the perma-
nent heavenly spheres and the permanent individuals in them, as well 
as the various species on earth, but playing no role in the lives of im-
permanent individuals within species—whether plant, animal, or hu-
man (Guide 3.17)—beyond ensuring that they have what they need to 
thrive. All else, according to Maimonides’ reading of Aristotle, is left 
to chance.
In this matter, too, there is reason to suspect that Maimonides is an 
Aristotelian. First, Maimonides credits Aristotle with following “what 
is manifest in the nature of that which exists” (3.17: 468) and, second, 
as Maimonides progresses from Guide 3.17 to 3.18 to 3.51, he moves 
increasingly further from the position he designates “our opinion,” 
or the opinion of the Torah, and increasingly closer to Aristotle’s.19 
The Torah’s position emphasizes desert: God rewards goodness and 
punishes sin, so that when a human being—though not an animal or 
plant—prospers or suffers harm it is because he or she has done right 
or done wrong. The clear implication of the Torah’s position is that 
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what sets human beings apart from plants and animals is free will, and 
for that reason divine providence in the form of reward and punish-
ment devolves only on human beings. As the discussion continues, 
Maimonides preserves the connection between divine providence and 
desert, but subtly replaces free will with intellect as the distinguishing 
mark of human beings. What, however, has greater intelligence to do 
with desert, and hence with divine providence? one begins to suspect 
that desert has already fallen by the wayside, or will do so imminently. 
And indeed, by the time Maimonides gets to 3.51, divine providence 
has come to depend completely on the intellect or, more precisely, on 
the extent to which a human being’s intellect is absorbed in God. Re-
markably, when a human being ceases to be absorbed in God, even 
momentarily, he is, Maimonides says, subject to chance—anything 
might befall him (see 3.18: 476, and especially 3.51: 625–26).20 But 
why is it that the person absorbed in God suffers no ill? Is it that God 
protects him? If God protects the man of superior intellect, why would 
He neglect the morally righteous? The answer is clear. All people, like 
all plants and animals, are, on the individual level, subject to chance. It 
is not as if God “looks after” anyone.21 But, the person who is absorbed 
in God is nevertheless invulnerable to the “bad” things that befall him, 
because he is oblivious to them. His intellect is “with God” and so he 
feels no pain; he suffers neither hunger nor thirst; he experiences no 
loss. It is not that things of that kind do not happen to him; it is that 
they do not affect him. He loses awareness of his body and so is not 
susceptible to the harms that afflict it. As soon as he becomes once 
again conscious of his body he is no less immune to pain and suffering 
than anyone else.22 Moses could go without food or water for forty 
days when he ascended Mt. Sinai to receive the tablets of the Law 
(Guide 3.51: 620)—but surely could not do so just before or after. It 
was his thorough absorption in God that made him not feel the bodily 
deprivations that he endured.23
This view, let us note, is utterly Aristotelian.  For one of the two fea-
tures of the life of moral virtue that, according to Aristotle, disqualify 
it from being the very best life is that the morally virtuous are suscep-
tible to misfortune.24 But isn’t everyone vulnerable to misfortune? For 
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Aristotle, the philosopher is not—and for that reason (among many 
others) the life of contemplation is the best and happiest life. He who 
lives the contemplative life is, Aristotle believes, immune to troubles, 
not because terrible things cannot happen to their bodies, but because 
they transcend their composite nature and live as though immortal 
(EN 10.6.8).25 of course, for both Aristotle and Maimonides the phi-
losopher only intermittently reaches the heights of contemplation. He 
does not—cannot—absolutely transcend his human condition while 
alive. It is for that reason that Aristotle says that we should live in ac-
cordance with the divine element in us only “as much as possible” (EN 
10.7.8), and Maimonides cites approvingly Elihu’s interpretation of 
Job’s situation, namely, that any divine providence that human beings 
enjoy is necessarily short-lived.26 No human being is immune to harm 
because no human being transcends his humanness indefinitely.
Interestingly, as Socrates sees it, it is moral virtue that acts as a pro-
phylactic against suffering. He asserts in the Apology (30c) that “no 
harm can come to a good man,” that is, to a man who is morally up-
right.27 He believes that a man can will himself to identify with his 
soul. So long, then, as a man preserves his soul in pristine condition, all 
bad things that happen affect his body alone—not him. Aristotle, who 
believes that only intellect raises the human being to the level at which 
he transcends his body, mocks Socrates’ view, saying that no one could 
profess it save “for the sake of maintaining a paradox.”28
Piety as Service
Piety, in Socrates’ own conception of it (Ap. 30a–b), is the service he 
provides to the god by examining others, showing them they are not 
wise, and exhorting them to virtue. In the absence of any firm convic-
tion that such a being as the god exists 29—as we saw, Socrates’ god is 
the prop upon which he hangs his mission to philosophize—what does 
it mean to Socrates to “serve the god”?
There are three components to Socrates’ pious service: (1) humility 
(his awareness that he does not now know—and will never know—the 
most important things [Ap. 21b]); (2) his trust that there are, never-
theless, more important things than money, reputation, pleasure, and 
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family (Ap. 29d–e, 30b; Crito 48c)—the merely human things; and (3) 
his sense of what the god would want if there were a god, namely, that 
human beings be just and virtuous (Ap. 30a–b).
Socrates is alarmed by what he sees around him: the corruption in 
politics and the pervasive competitive spirit leading to the shameless 
embrace of injustice and a disdain for the just man as a fool. The wild 
popularity of the sophists and rhetoricians of his day convinces him 
that the time to “fight for justice” (Ap. 32a1) is now. And so, Socra-
tes serves the god. Neglecting his own needs, incurring hatred as he 
goes, the prophetic figure Socrates ventures out into the marketplace 
to compel his fellow citizens to confront their ignoble ways. If there 
were a god, he would surely wish to cultivate justice and righteousness 
among men. But even if there were a god, the divine work would fall 
to human beings.
Maimonides, too, is keenly aware of the great need his people have 
for religious leadership. The time during which he lived was, on the 
one hand, one in which Jews suffered religious persecution and, on the 
other, one in which they were exposed to the influence of philosophy 
and science. Whereas Maimonides applauds the study of philosophy 
and science,30 he fears that it might result in the abandonment by the 
educated of religious observance (Guide, Introduction: 5). And he was 
singularly unimpressed by the quality of the Jewish religious leader-
ship of his time:  he witnessed the unreflective acceptance by the lead-
ers—no less than by the laity—of crude religious views, as well as their 
widespread trust in the efficacy of vain and foolish superstitious rites.
In the Introduction to his Code Maimonides articulates the source of 
his concern and his response to it as follows:  
At this time inordinate sufferings befell us and the urgency of the mo-
ment pressed upon us all. The wisdom of our wise men and the intelli-
gence of our intelligent men was hidden from us. . . . on these grounds, 
I, Moses the son of Maimon the Sephardi, put my trust in the Rock, 
may He be blessed, [and compiled] this work to serve as a compendium 
of the entire oral Law. . . . I have entitled this work Mishneh Torah (“A 
Second Torah”), so that a person who reads the Written Torah first and 
then reads this work will know the entire oral Law and will not find it 
necessary to read any other of the books in between.
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And in his Introduction to the Guide (16) Maimonides justifies his 
writing a book that contains secrets of the Torah that one is not per-
mitted to discuss openly or publicly by pointing to the exigency of the 
times. He quotes Ps. 119.126: “It is time to act for the Lord; they have 
made void Thy Torah.”
What motivates Maimonides to devote himself to the enlightenment 
of others? Like Socrates, Maimonides is aware of the desperate situa-
tion of his people. yet, does the mere recognition of the wretched state 
of one’s people necessarily lead one to care for them? Maimonides, in 
seeking to address this question, provides in the Guide a remarkable 
and illuminating analysis of what it is that impels some men to go 
beyond concern for their own personal perfection to concern for the 
moral and intellectual perfection of others.
In his discussion of prophecy in Guide 2.37, Maimonides disting-
ishes three classes of men: (1) those in whom the divine intellectual 
overflow reaches only the rational faculty—these are men of specula-
tion; (2) those in whom it reaches both the rational and the imagina-
tive faculties—these are prophets; and (3) those in whom it reaches 
only the imaginative faculty—these are legislators, soothsayers, augurs, 
and dreamers of veridical dreams.
Maimonides further subdivides each of the first two classes. In each, 
the quantity of the divine overflow either may be such as to render the 
individual perfect but to have no further effect, or it may be such that 
the measure “overflows from rendering him perfect toward rendering 
others perfect” (375).  
Note that it is not by quantity of divine overflow that prophets are 
distinguished from men of speculation. Among both prophets and 
men of speculation there are those who receive more than the amount 
of divine overflow needed for their own perfection and those who re-
ceive just enough. Even a prophet, then, need not be capable of bring-
ing his prophecy to the people. According to Maimonides those men 
of speculation who do have the surfeit of overflow are “moved of neces-
sity” or “compelled” “to compose works and to teach.” A prophet in 
this condition will “address a call to the people, teach them, and let his 
own perfection overflow toward them.”
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one aspect of this Maimonidean account remains puzzling and un-
satisfying: why should additional divine intellectual overflow motivate, 
compel, or create a desire in the one who experiences it to share it with 
others? To be sure, extra overflow would account for an individual’s 
ability to do more than perfect himself, but why would he “of neces-
sity” do so? A man might have far more money than he needs for his 
own sustenance, and so would surely be capable of helping others, but 
is there anything in the sheer fact of having more than one needs that 
moves someone to share his bounty? Interestingly, in Guide 2.11 Mai-
monides compares the overflow that flows from God onto the separate 
intellects and from them onto the Active Intellect to the way in which 
the overabundance of wealth that a very rich man has devolves on a 
second man and on a third:  
It is as if you said, by way of example, that there is an individual who 
has wealth sufficing only for his own necessities, no residue being left 
over from it from which someone else might receive a benefit; and 
that there is another individual who has enough wealth for a residue 
to be left over from it for the enrichment of many people, so that this 
one may give a measure of it to another individual through which this 
second would also become rich, while a residue is left over from it that 
suffices for the enrichment of a third individual. (275)  
In this analogy, although the man who possesses excess wealth has 
enough money for it to flow from him to a second and then on to a 
third, there is no implication that the first man will want to, be moved 
to, or, a fortiori, feel compelled to, share his wealth with the second 
and third. Indeed, Maimonides acknowledges in his Code, Laws con-
cerning Moral Conduct 1.1, that there is “one type of individual who 
is so greedy that all the money in the world would not satisfy him. of 
him it is said: ‘For one who loves silver, no amount of silver will suffice’ 
(Eccles. 5.9).”
Just as Maimonides surely recognizes that simply having more than 
one needs does not in itself create the desire to part with the surplus, 
he clearly must also see that men of speculation who write books and 
teach, and prophets who address a call to the people and seek to lead 
them to perfection, are moved by something other than surplus intel-
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lect. What is true of God, namely, that His excess intellect simply spills 
over from Him down the chain of intellects to the Active Intellect, 
is not true of human beings who must purposefully choose to direct 
their excess intellect to others. Composing works and teaching and ad-
dressing a call and leading people to perfection does not just happen 
by itself. 
What is it, then, that causes some men of speculation, but not oth-
ers who are equally able, to compose written works? What is it that 
inspires some prophets but not others—even if they are equally perfect 
in intellect and imagination—to reach out to the people? If gener-
osity of spirit is what induces one abundantly wealthy man to share 
his wealth while another hoards his, is it not piety that motivates one 
intellectually able man to act on his ability to perfect others while an-
other does nothing? Individuals who act make the choice to expend 
the requisite effort to extend their own perfection to others. At times, 
their involvement with others even ends up costing them their lives. 
Although Maimonides says that it is “this divine overflow” that is re-
sponsible for “moving them and by no means letting them be quiet, 
even if they met with great misfortunes” (375), it is evident that this 
overflow alone could not so move them. The motivation to help others 
would have to come from within. Maimonides quotes Jer. 8.9, where 
Jeremiah confesses that after suffering reproach and derision all day, he 
made up his mind not to continue to speak in God’s name—but he 
could not stick to his resolve:  “There is in my heart as it were a burning 
fire shut up in my bones, and I weary myself to hold it in, but cannot.” 
This burning fire is not intellectual overflow that of itself spills out of 
Jeremiah and onto others; it is, instead, a passion to serve God that 
Jeremiah discovers within himself and which he cannot quell. Socrates 
and Maimonides, too, though perhaps without Jeremiah’s burning pas-
sion, are not content to perfect themselves. They serve God by seeking 
to perfect their fellow men.  
Maimonides singles out for special recognition four men who devote 
their lives to others. In 3.51 he describes the uniqueness of Moses and 
of the Patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The first distinguishing 
characteristic of these men is that they have their intellects constantly 
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in God’s presence even as they conduct, “with their limbs only,” their 
worldly pursuits (624).31 But the second mark that sets these four men 
apart is that
in all these actions their end was to come near to Him, may He be ex-
alted; and how near!  For the end of their efforts during their life was to 
bring into being a religious community that would know and worship 
God . . . to spread the doctrine of the unity of the Name in the world 
and to guide people to love Him, may He be exalted. (624)32
The implication of Maimonides’ words is that the closeness to God 
that these men attained prompted them to direct their divine overflow 
toward others, to bring others to the perfection they enjoyed. Although 
Maimonides does not call their activity hasidut, the Hebrew term he 
uses for “piety” (even in those of his works composed in Arabic), he 
does call it “pure worship of great import.” And what he describes by 
this expression is the very practice to which Socrates alludes, as we have 
seen, in defending himself against the charge of impiety.
It is in this passage that Maimonides calls attention to the purity of 
his own divine worship. For, rather strikingly, he uses his discussion 
of Moses and the Patriarchs as an opportunity to reflect upon his own 
situation. He laments not that the guidance that would lead one to the 
attainment of the rank achieved by these men eludes all others, but 
rather that it eludes, as he puts it, “someone like myself ” (624).33 The 
highest rank that one may aspire to attain through training, he says, is 
the rank that is one step below that of Moses and the Patriarchs. It is, 
then, only to this second rank that Maimonides thinks “someone like 
myself ” might aspire. 
It is evident that Maimonides means to reveal in this context one as-
pect of his self-understanding. For if his aim were only to differentiate 
the level of closeness to God attained by Moses, Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob from that attainable by other men, a general statement would 
have sufficed; he need not have said, “someone like myself.” He men-
tions himself because he wishes to  convey to his readers that although 
he is not able to achieve the rank of these four men—the rank at which 
one is able to tend to worldly affairs “with one’s limbs only”—he is 
nevertheless in the same business as they. Maimonides may not be able, 
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as Moses and the Patriarchs are, to concentrate his thoughts exclusively 
on God regardless of what he is doing, instead being able to do so only 
when he is at leisure. But in those rare and precious moments when 
he is at leisure, the way in which he worships God, attaches himself to 
God, and basks in God’s presence is by composing books—for others.
Imitatio dei
Toward the close of the Guide, at the end of its final chapter, 3.54, 
Maimonides proclaims that once an individual has achieved the appre-
hension of God and knowledge of  “His providence extending over His 
creatures as manifested in the act of bringing them into being and in 
their governance as it is,” he “will always have in view loving-kindness, 
righteousness, and judgment, through assimilation to His actions, may 
He be exalted” (638). Is it true, however, that when men exercise lov-
ing-kindness, righteousness, and judgment, they are in fact assimilat-
ing their actions to God’s? or are they acting instead as God cannot? 
Indeed, once an individual apprehends God and understands God’s 
governance “as it is,” will he not recognize not only that God governs 
as no man can, but also that men govern as God cannot?
Not only in 3.54 but in 1.54 as well, Maimonides appears to encour-
age men to act as God does: 
For the utmost virtue of man is to become like unto Him, may He 
be exalted, as far as he is able; which means that we should make our 
actions like unto His, as the Sages made clear when interpreting the 
verse, ‘ye shall be holy’ (Lev. 19:2). They said:  ‘As He is gracious, so be 
you also gracious; as He is merciful, so be you also merciful.’ 
(Sifre on Deut. 1969, 10.12; also BT Shabbat 133b)
yet, in closing this chapter, Maimonides states its purpose as follows: 
“The purpose of all this is to show that the attributes ascribed to Him 
are attributes of His actions, and that they do not mean that He pos-
sesses qualities.” (Guide I.54)
If the purpose of Maimonides’ discussion of divine attributes is to 
teach that God has no attributes—that He is not loving or kind or 
compassionate or just—what could it possibly mean for us to “make 
our actions like unto His”? We, after all, do have attributes, attributes 
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that shape and give character to our actions. We act, then, not as God 
does but as only men do—our actions reflect our attributes. It may 
well be that a human ruler or judge should be dispassionate in his rul-
ings (126), but being dispassionate is not at all like not being subject 
to passion.
If we consider the matter of God’s governance, we see that Maimo-
nides locates God’s kindness in that He provides for the survival and 
flourishing of embryos, and His graciousness in His act of bringing 
beings into existence and governing them though they have no claim 
upon Him to existence or governance. yet, we are cautioned that the 
only sense in which God’s actions are kind, merciful, and gracious, is 
that actions of the same sort, were we to perform them, would have 
that character (124). It follows, then, that when we act kindly, merci-
fully, or graciously we are not imitating God at all, for we, unlike God, 
do actually exercise kindness, mercy, or graciousness in performing our 
actions.
In this chapter Maimonides furthermore urges the governor-prophet 
to 
acquire similarity to these attributes, so that these actions may proceed 
from him according to a determined measure and according to the 
deserts of the people who are affected by them and not merely because 
of his following a passion [but] in accordance with what is fitting. 
                   (126)
How can we, in reading this passage, fail to be reminded that in 3.18 
and 3.51 Maimonides acknowledges that most of us, most of the time, 
are governed by chance, such that for as long as we are not concentrat-
ing our thoughts wholly on God, the righteous are no less vulnerable 
to harm than the wicked? If we are expected to treat people in accord-
ance with their deserts, we are, once again, being asked to do what God 
does not do.
In the final analysis, what it means to know God’s governance is to 
know that human governance cannot be like it at all. At 3.23: 496–97, 
Maimonides says:  
But the notion of His providence is not the same as the notion of our 
providence; nor is the notion of His governance of the things created 
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by Him the same as the notion of our governance of that which we 
govern. The two notions are not comprised in one definition, contrary 
to what is thought by all who are confused, and there is nothing in 
common between the two except in name alone. In the same way, 
our act does not resemble His act; and the two are not comprised in 
one and the same definition. Just as natural acts differ from those of 
craftsmanship, so do the divine governance of, the divine providence 
for, and the divine purpose with regard to, those natural matters differ 
from our human governance, providence for, and purpose with regard 
to, the things we govern, we provide for, and purpose. 
This passage leaves no doubt that in our actions, in our governance, 
in our purposes, we in no way imitate God. And the difference is that 
whereas our actions are the actions of “craftsmen”—that is, they are 
designed and deliberate—God’s actions are not crafted; they simply 
proceed from Him. We can act as we believe God would act were He 
not God but man; but we cannot act as God does in fact act.
Since God’s overflow simply emanates from Him to others, since 
God does not “craft” His actions, since He has no attributes and His 
actions have only the attributes they would have if they were human 
actions, it is impossible for human beings to act upon others and upon 
the world as God does. Imitatio dei in political governance and social 
relations is not only not possible; it also reveals an utter failure to ap-
prehend God and to understand the way in which He governs. 
To be sure, Maimonides nevertheless does not suppose that “the Lord 
hath forsaken the earth” (Ezek. 9.19); he believes instead that “the earth 
is the Lord’s” (Ex. 9.29).34 But, as Maimonides explains, the sense in 
which the earth is the Lord’s is that “His providence also extends over 
the earth in the way that corresponds to what the latter is, just as His 
providence extends over the heavens in the way that corresponds to 
what they are” (3.54: 637). God’s providence over the earth is, then, 
unlike His providence over the heavens, for the nature of earth and 
heavens is not the same. God’s providence over the heavens is direct; 
the heavens require no more than that God be. God’s providence over 
the earth, however, is indirect, because the earth contains men who 
require the special attentions that only other men can provide. When 
Jeremiah says that what a man should glory in is “that he understands 
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and knows Me, that I am the Lord who exercise loving-kindness, jus-
tice, and righteousness in the earth,” what he means is that 
it is My purpose that there should come from you loving-kindness, 
righteousness, and judgment in the earth in the way we have explained 
with regard to the thirteen attributes: namely, that the purpose should 
be assimilation to them and that this should be our way of life.
(3.54: 637; emphasis added)35
If God has not forsaken the earth it is because He has human agents 
who can do “in the earth” (Jer. 9.23) what He cannot. The thirteen 
divine attributes are not God’s;36 they are attributed to Him in order 
to motivate human beings to incorporate them into their interpersonal 
relations.37
None of this is to say that imitatio dei has no place in Maimonides’ 
thinking. on the contrary, it is one of many forms that divine worship 
takes. Among these various forms are, first, prayer, ritual observance, 
and the cultivation of moral habits. These, however, Maimonides tells 
us, are but preparatory for the highest form of worship which is the 
attachment of our thoughts exclusively to God to the extent of our 
ability. of course, in order that the object of our love be God (and not 
something that is merely a figment of our imagination), we must come 
to know Him—that is, we must attain intellectual apprehension of 
Him. It is this that Maimonides calls “love of God” (3.51: 621).38  
For Maimonides, to know God is to know (through demonstration) 
what He is not—that He is unlike anything we can experience or con-
ceive and hence that He certainly has no attributes.39 There is, however, 
one exception to this rule. For one positive thing we know about God 
is that His activity is intellection (though here, too, we must be cau-
tious: His intellection is certainly not like ours [1.1: 23]). Since intel-
lect is the “bond” between God and human beings (3.51: 620, 621; 
3.52: 629; see also 1.1: 23), since it is because of our intellect that we 
are said to be created “in God’s image” (Gen. 1.27; Guide 1.1: 23), it 
follows that it is in activating our intellects and in striving for intellec-
tual perfection that we imitate God, that we practice imitatio dei. For 
it is in doing something that God Himself does—albeit in a very dif-
ferent way—that one imitates God. But insofar as in interacting with 
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individual human beings in fairness and kindness we do something 
that God Himself does not do in any way at all, we cannot be said to 
be practicing imitatio dei when we act within the political or social or 
moral context.40
Beyond moral conduct, beyond ritual practice, and beyond even 
knowledge of God and the imitatio dei that is intellection, there is the 
highest form of divine worship:  the total immersion of one’s intellect 
in God.  Those who achieved this to the greatest extent—Abraham, 
Isaac, Jacob, and Moses—also sought to improve the condition of oth-
ers.41 Their “pure worship of great import” is what we have been calling 
“piety.” It is not, nor is it characterized as, imitatio dei.
Conclusion
Although Socrates and Maimonides hold unconventional religious be-
liefs, each is convinced that he has a divine mission. For Socrates it is 
to persuade people of the value of justice and truth. For Maimonides 
it is to encourage meticulous observance of Jewish law in its ritual 
and moral aspects (that is, to promote the welfare of the body) and to 
banish false and noxious views of God as much as possible (that is, to 
promote the welfare of the soul). The devotion of both these men to 
their fellow men, their willingness, at great personal sacrifice, to work 
to improve the condition of those less perfect than themselves, is an 
expression of their devotion to god. It constitutes, in a word, their pi-
ety.  For they assist God by taking on the tasks that He would perform 
if only He could. 
End Notes
1. Quotations of passages in Plato’s Apology and Crito are from West and West 
1984, on occasion modified slightly. All other translations of passages in works 
of Plato and Aristotle are my own and based on the oxford (Plato 1900–07) 
and Loeb (Aristotle 1926) editions.
2. In a letter to his student Joseph, written slightly later, in the 1190’s, Maimo-
nides, after having been stung by criticism of his legal Code, tells Joseph that 
he wrote that work primarily for himself. But that remains most unlikely. See 
Maimonides, Epistulae (1946, 50–52).
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 All quotations from the Guide of the Perplexed (hereafter abbreviated Guide) 
are from the translation by S. Pines (1963), slightly modified on occa-
sion.  References are to book, chapter, and page numbers of this translation.  
Translations of passages from Maimonides’ Code as well as from rabbinic texts 
are my own.  References in this essay to the Code are to the work he calls the 
Mishneh Torah (Maimonides 2000).
3. In biblical Hebrew the word for charity (zedaqah) and the word for justice 
(zedeq) are nearly the same. That is because God—though not men—may de-
mand both equally, insofar as all property is ultimately God’s. Thus, when the 
Torah requires, as zedaqah, that a poor man’s pledge be returned to him at sun-
set so that he be able to cover himself with his garment when he sleeps (Deut. 
24.13), the Torah goes beyond what mere human justice (zedeq) demands. The 
returning of the cloak is, however, required by a kind of justice, zedaqah: the 
cloak’s rightful owner, God, demands the cloak’s return on behalf of the poor 
man who needs it. Maimonides (Guide 3.52: 631) defines charity as “justice 
unto the rational soul”: “For when you walk in the way of the moral virtues, 
you do justice unto your rational soul, giving her the due that is her right.”
4. A view that had great currency in Socrates’ day was that justice is a matter of 
helping friends and harming enemies. This is implicitly Crito’s view in the 
Crito (it is the view that both motivates him to plan Socrates’ jailbreak and 
makes him feel troubled by Socrates’ acquiescence in his plight), and explicitly 
Polemarchus’s view in Rep. 1. In responding to both of these interlocutors 
Socrates makes a point of characterizing justice as a matter of not harm-
ing anyone. yet he conspicuously avoids including in his characterization of 
justice any reference to helping others, whether friend or foe. Justice is at its 
core impartial: it does not differentiate friend from foe. Piety, however, that is, 
Socrates’ service to his fellow men, permits him to favor those closest to him 
(“but more so for my fellow-citizens, inasmuch as you are closer to me in kin” 
—Ap. 30a), though, as he says in the very same passage, he will converse with 
“whomever I happen to meet—younger or older, foreigner or fellow-citizen.”  
Even in Rep. 7, where philosophers, whose clear preference is not to rule, are 
persuaded to rule by considerations of justice, justice is framed as repaying a 
debt to those who nurtured them (see 520a–e). The implication of this way 
of framing the obligation is that justice requires that one play fair, that one 
return good for good. The consideration of “helping others” forms no part of 
the argument from justice.
5. And so, Socrates says at Crito 46b: “I, not only now but always, am such as to 
obey nothing else of what is mine but the argument that appears best to me 
upon reasoning.”
6. Maimonides’ Aristotle is filtered through the prism of his Greek and Arabic 
commentators—Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, al-Farabi, ibn Bajja, 
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Avicenna, and Averroes—and emerges both neoplatonized and otherwise 
modified.
7. one such heretical view is the denial of the (bodily) resurrection of the dead.  
See n. 12, below.
8. Although there are three other metaphors discussed before this one, the discus-
sion culminates with this final and decisive one. The others, it can be shown, 
build progressively toward this one.
9. The difference in value between the literal text and the text’s true meaning is 
not quantitative, but qualitative. See Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 1.59 of 
the parable of the king who has millions of gold coins but is praised for having 
millions of silver ones. Maimonides explains that the error involved in saying 
that the king has millions of silver coins when what he has is millions of gold 
coins is not the same as the one involved in saying that he has 100 gold coins 
when he has millions. The first of these instances of underestimating the king’s 
wealth is qualitative; the second, quantitative. Note the metaphorical use here, 
too, of silver and gold to convey qualitative difference.
10. Although Maimonides justifies the Torah’s use of corporeal language to 
describe God on the grounds that the masses cannot be persuaded of the exist-
ence of anything incorporeal, he nevertheless also blames the literal text for 
actually causing people to believe in divine corporeality and attributes (Guide 
1.31: 67; 1.51: 114; 1.53: 119).
11. This mishnaic tractate is commonly known in English as Ethics of the Fathers.
12. Maimonides experienced first hand the danger of not concealing certain views 
sufficiently well from the masses. He was, it seems, less than convincing in his 
perfunctory statement in support of the doctrine of bodily resurrection in his 
Commentary to Sanhedrin 10 (Maimonides 1981) and in his even less expan-
sive remark in his Code (Laws concerning Repentance 3.6), and people suspect-
ed (rightly, in my view) that he did not really believe in bodily resurrection but 
only in the immortality of the intellect. The Jews of yemen may have suffered 
a deterioration of their faith as a result of their suspicions, and Maimonides 
felt compelled to set the record straight, so to speak, by composing the “Essay 
on Resurrection” (Maimonides 1985, 211–45).
13. The idea, for example, that God becomes violently angry with those who diso-
bey Him is one that Maimonides regards as necessary—but as literally false.
14. At Guide 2.13: 252, Maimonides says of creation that it is “a basis of the 
Torah of Moses our Master, peace be on him. And it is second to the basis that 
is the belief in the unity [of God].”
15. only when Maimonides is at his most defensive—that is, in his “Essay on 
Roslyn Weiss 165
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007
Resurrection” (see note 12, above), where he fends off the suspicion that he 
does not believe in the resurrection of the dead—does he say that he adheres 
to the Torah’s literal sense unless it is utterly impossible to do so (as in the case 
of the corporeality of God). As he explains, once having admitted creation, he 
no longer has grounds for rejecting any miracle, including bodily resurrection 
(1985, 228). It is noteworthy, however, that, even when thus in apologetic 
mode, Maimonides admits the importance to him of interpreting the text 
in conformity with reason and the natural: “I try to reconcile the Law and 
reason, and wherever possible consider all things as of the natural order.  only 
when something is explicitly identified as a miracle, and reinterpretation of it 
cannot be accommodated, only then do I feel forced to grant that this is a mir-
acle” (223).  Maimonides was roundly criticized by a number of eminent me-
dieval Jewish biblical exegetes for the liberties he took with the text. Alarmed 
by Maimonides’ radically allegorical approach, Abarbanel was moved to 
exclaim: “In truth, it is infidelity and a grave sin to contradict the plain sense 
of the [biblical] verses; if this is what we do to them this leprosy will spread to 
all verses and result in interpretations that contradict their [i.e. the verses’] true 
intent” (commentary on Hos. 1, in Mikraot Gedolot Orim Gedolim 1992–99).  
Nahmanides chastised Maimonides for allowing his philosophical beliefs to 
supersede the actual meaning of the Torah: “These things contradict the text.  
It is forbidden to listen to them—and certainly to believe them” (commentary 
on Gen. 18. 1, in Nahmanides 2004).
16. Maimonides’ target is the Kalam thinkers, whether Muslim or Jewish.
17. Fear of God is unrelated to fear of punishment. As Maimonides defines fear of 
God in the Code, Laws concerning the Foundations of the Torah 2.2, it is man’s 
shrinking back in recognition “that he is but a small, lowly, dark creature 
who, with his inferior and meager mind, stands before Him who is perfect in 
His knowledge.” The notion of fear of God is perhaps best captured in King 
David’s utterance: “When I consider Thy Heavens, the work of Thy fingers. . . . 
What is man that Thou art mindful of him?” (Ps. 8.4, 5). (Maimonides, in his 
Book of Commandments, lists fearing God as fourth among the 248 affirma-
tive precepts. It derives from Deut. 6.13 and 10.20: “The Lord, thy God, shalt 
thou fear.” The entire list is included at the beginning of Maimonides 2000.)
18. At the end of Guide 2.25 Maimonides poses the following questions that he 
claims are more difficult to answer on the assumption that the world is eternal 
than on the assumption that it is created: why did God bestow prophetic 
revelation on one man rather than on another; why did He give the Torah 
to one particular nation and not to all; why did He choose to legislate at one 
particular time rather than at another; why did he entrust a particular prophet 
with one miracle rather than another; what was God’s aim in setting forth the 
Torah; and why did He not implant the observance of the commandments 
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in human nature. Maimonides states that on the creation assumption one 
can simply dispose of these questions by saying: “God wanted it this way” or 
“This is what God’s wisdom required.” But on the eternity assumption one 
must have recourse to “unseemly answers in which there would be combined 
the giving the lie to, and the annulment of, all the external meanings of the 
Law with regard to which no intellectual man has any doubt that they are to 
be taken in their external meanings” (329–30). Maimonides, as we have seen, 
is not methodologically disposed to interpret the Torah as literally as possible.  
Moreover, it is likely that at least to some of the questions on this list he would 
find the eternity assumption more congenial. For example, to the question, 
why did God choose a particular prophet rather than another, there is no 
reason why Maimonides could not easily answer: “because prophecy devolves 
upon one who has perfected himself morally, spiritually, and intellectually.”  
To the question, why did God not implant in human nature the observance of 
the commandments, his answer would surely be that free will is itself a feature 
of human nature.
19. It is striking that Maimonides in Guide 3.17 seeks to lend credibility to the 
Torah’s view by contrasting it with the far less plausible views of Epicurus, the 
Ashariyya, and the Mutazila. But he throws his readers off the scent by listing 
Aristotle’s view among those more absurd than that of the Torah—indeed, he 
places it second, right after Epicurus’s.
20. Despite Maimonides’ explicit statements that individual human beings, no 
matter how righteous, are subject to chance when not intellectually absorbed 
in God, he nevertheless writes that it is forbidden to believe that anything that 
happens occurs by chance. See Code, Laws concerning Fast Days 1.3; also Guide 
3.36.  Maimonides fears that unless people trace their troubles to their actions, 
they will have no incentive to mend their ways.
21. We note a parallel in Aristotle, who in his Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1926; 
hereafter EN) tempers his radical claim that philosophers are happiest because 
they are most like the gods (10.8.7), by saying, rather improbably, in 10.8.13, 
that the philosopher is happiest because he is most beloved by the gods—as if 
gods who are self-sufficient and whose activity and virtue are purely intellec-
tual (10.8.7) might prefer some men to others.
22. one’s very consciousness of suffering is a sign that one is no longer “with 
God.”
23. Another way of understanding divine providence is as follows: once a human 
being comes to value only his intellectual attachment to God, the things of the 
body are no longer of consequence. This I take to be Maimonides’ interpreta-
tion of the Book of Job. Job’s misery abated once he gained understanding.  
Until then he “had imagined that the things thought to be happiness, such 
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as health, wealth, and children, are the ultimate goal” (3.23: 493).  Maimo-
nides notes that although Job is described as morally virtuous and righteous 
in action, he is not said to be wise or intelligent. “For if he had been wise, his 
situation would not have been obscure to him” (3.22: 487).
24. The other is that one can possess moral virtue while asleep or without ever 
exercising it.  See EN 1.5.6.
25. A fairly widespread, but in my view mistaken, interpretation of the difference 
between Aristotle’s and Maimonides’ stance on the matter of chance is the 
following by D. Frank:  “Maimonides believes that the prophet, paradigmatic 
in both character and intellectual attainment, is insulated from contingency, a 
view seemingly opposed to the ineliminability of luck in the Aristotelian moral 
scheme” (2003, 144).
26. In the Guide, at 3.23: 495, Maimonides interprets Elihu’s innovation as the 
view that an angel intercedes for a man who is deathly ill, but “this does not 
continue always, there being no intercession that goes on forever, for it only 
takes place two or three times.”
27. See also Gorg. 470e, where Socrates declares that, as he sees it, a person’s hap-
piness depends exclusively on “how he stands with respect to education and 
justice. . . . For I assert that the noble and good man and woman are happy; 
the unjust and base, wretched.”
28. Aristotle does not name Socrates as the target of his mockery, and not all 
scholars agree that it is Socrates whom Aristotle has in mind—some think he 
has the Cynics in view. I do not think it likely, however, that he intends any-
one other than Socrates. Note that he proceeds next to discuss Plato’s views.  
See EN 1.5.6.
one might wonder if Aristotle’s (Maimonides’) position is not itself absurd.  
Can any human being be utterly invulnerable to pain? Although surely 
extreme, the Aristotelian-Maimonidean view may not be wholly at odds with 
ordinary experience. People who are thoroughly absorbed in any activity or 
task lose awareness of their bodies and of their bodies’ needs while they are ab-
sorbed. They forget to eat or drink; they can go without sleep; and they delay 
the execution of other bodily functions. Why, then, could not a man absorbed 
in God or in the eternal verities of the universe be oblivious to bodily and 
emotional pain?
29. Socrates’ awareness of his own ignorance with respect to “the most important 
things” surely extends to the existence and nature of the gods.
30. In his Code, Laws concerning the Foundations of the Torah 4.13, Maimonides 
quotes the Talmud (Sukkah 28a, in Babylonian Talmud 1966 [hereafter BT]), 
where it is said that the Account of the Chariot (which Maimonides equates 
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with metaphysics) is “the great thing,” and the discussions of the Sages Abaye 
and Rava, “the lesser thing.” According to Maimonides, the matter of what 
is forbidden and permitted, which occupies the debates between Abaye and 
Rava, is to precede the deeper and more important topics of metaphysics, the 
secrets of the Torah. Maimonides regards the oral tradition as containing the 
truths of metaphysics. They were not written down, he says, for fear that they 
would become corrupted and would give rise to confusion.  (See Guide 1.71: 
175–76.)  At Guide 3.51: 618–19, Maimonides contends that those who 
get closest to God are those who have knowledge of Him. Those who devote 
their lives to the study of the practical law and who accept unreflectively the 
true principles of faith are two levels behind. Those who study mathematics 
and logic are at level 4; those who study physics are at level 5; only those who 
master metaphysics (“the divine science”) are at level 6, and have entered the 
“inner chamber” of the king’s residence.
31. Cf. Code, Laws concerning Character Traits 3.3, where it is said of one who 
serves the Lord that he does so continuously—even as he engages in business, 
in sexual intercourse, and in sleep—but it is not said of him that his thoughts 
are occupied with God throughout these activities. The claim is instead that he 
is seeking through them to perfect his body and fulfill its needs so that he can 
devote himself fully to God.
32. Maimonides twice mentions the efforts of these men. The divine overflow did 
not in their case produce of itself the religious community these men strove to 
bring into existence, nor was their achievement automatic or effortless.
33. Pines (Guide 3.51: 634, n. 32) points out that the Arabic here is ambiguous, 
and may signify either that Maimonides could not aspire to be guided toward 
achieving the rank of Moses and the Patriarchs, or that he could not aspire to 
guide others with a view to their achieving this rank. I favor (as Pines does) 
the first reading. As I understand Maimonides, the point he seeks to make is 
that although he cannot achieve the rank of these four men, he can, like them, 
take steps to bring a religious community into being.
34. The view that “the Lord hath forsaken the earth” is ascribed by Maimonides to 
Aristotle in the discussion of divine providence in Guide 3.17: 466. Maimo-
nides, as we noted earlier, seeks to distance himself from the Aristotelian view 
even though it is closest to his own. Although Aristotle would surely not have 
said that God provides for the earth through His human agents, there is every 
reason to think that he would not spurn the idea that it is men’s task to govern 
the earth justly and fairly (insofar as God does not).
35. Cf. Code, Laws concerning Character Traits 1.6–7. Although Maimonides, 
when he speaks in this passage of the obligation to acquire the proper moral 
qualities and actions, indeed uses the term lehiddamot, “to imitate” or “to 
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resemble,” he does not expressly say that we are to imitate God. What he actu-
ally says is the following: “Even as He is called gracious, so you be gracious; 
even as He is called merciful, so you be merciful . . . . Thus did the prophets call 
the deity by all such characterizations—long-suffering, abounding in kind-
ness, righteous and upright, honest, mighty, powerful, etc.—in order to make 
known that these are good and proper paths, and that a person is obligated to 
conduct himself in accordance with them and to resemble [them] to the best 
of his ability . . . . And since these terms by which the Creator is called are the 
middle path in which we are obligated to go, this path is called God’s path . . .” 
(emphasis added). The clear implication of this text is that the way we are sup-
posed to be is not as God is but as He is called. As we have seen, the original 
rabbinic dictum upon which Maimonides’ text is based—but from which it 
quite consciously diverges—reads: “As He is gracious, so be you gracious; as 
He is merciful, so be you merciful” (BT Shabbat 133b). (Note: Where I have 
“them” in brackets, traditional versions of Maimonides’ Code have “Him.”  
But “Him” does not appear in the Bodleian manuscript containing Maimo-
nides’ autograph.)
36. The thirteen divine attributes derive from Ex. 34.6–7.
37. H. Arendt (2005, 239 and nn. 76 and 77) recounts that Jesus took the Scribes 
and Pharisees to task for their belief that it is not men but God who has the 
power to forgive—and that men’s power to forgive derives from God. Jesus’ 
view was that it is men who must forgive—forgiveness, he believed, is a hu-
man power—and divine forgiveness will follow. In my view, it is for Maimo-
nides because God cannot forgive that human beings must forgive. In doing 
God’s forgiving for Him, we do His work on earth. (I owe the reference to 
Arendt to Alan Udoff.)
38. Maimonides distinguishes between, on the one hand, the correct apprehen-
sion of God, which is love, and, on the other, the “turning wholly to God” 
(3.51: 620) that follows apprehension. He cites 1 Chron. 28.9, where David 
says to his son, Solomon, “And thou, Solomon my son, know thou the God 
of thy father and serve Him.” As Maimonides interprets this verse, to know 
God is to attain the correct (as opposed to an imagined) conception of God, 
but to serve Him, which follows knowing Him, is “total devotion to Him and 
the employment of intellectual thought in constantly serving Him.” The love 
that is knowledge differs from the constant love and devotion that is service. It 
is this second kind of love that is captured in the following two rabbinic pas-
sages: (1) “Another explanation of, ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God’ (Deut. 
6.5): Cause Him to be beloved by human beings, even as your father Abraham 
did” (Sifre on Deut. 6:5); (2) “ ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God’ means that 
because of you the name of Heaven will become beloved” (BT Yoma 86a).  
Maimonides quotes the former of these rabbinic dicta in his treatment of the 
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commandment to love God (the third in his enumeration of the 248 affirma-
tive commandments in his Book of Commandments).
39. There are several important scholars who maintain that Maimonides was skep-
tical with respect to knowledge of God, and that he was therefore tentative 
about such matters as creation and providence. In my view, however, although 
Maimonides surely thought that we can have no positive knowledge of God’s 
nature or essence, he strongly suggests that we can know what God is not. 
(According to Guide 1.59: 139, with each additional thing that we are able 
to negate with respect to God, we become more perfect in our knowledge of 
Him.) We can know, for example, by demonstration, that God has no body and 
is not subject to motion and change or to emotions and passions. Although 
Maimonides says that we do not know how God knows (Code, Laws concern-
ing Repentance 5.5), we nevertheless do know that He cannot have knowledge 
of what changes. Both creation, which would require that God be subject to 
change, and divine providence for individual human beings, which would 
require that God have knowledge of things that change, are thus precluded.
40. H. Davidson (2005, 365, 540) insists that Maimonides means to salvage 
for God some measure of “personality.” It would seem, however, that what 
Maimonides is most at pains to avoid is the ascription to God of anything like 
“personality.”
41. In his later years, S. Pines came to believe that Maimonides ranks the politi-
cal life above the intellectual (see, e.g., Pines 1979, 100). W. Harvey, however, 
who is convinced that for Maimonides intellectual excellence is the supreme 
perfection, maintains, against Pines, that the political life is a by-product of 
the achievement of intellectual perfection (Harvey 1980, 198–212). In my 
view, whereas it is true of God that governance is a by-product of intellec-
tion, it is not true of man that caring for others is a by-product of intellectual 
perfection. only the truly pious feel an obligation to serve God by governing 
others. Unlike Plato’s philosopher-kings who have to be compelled to rule, the 
truly pious seek to improve the spiritual and intellectual condition of others as 
a form of divine worship. Whereas those who have tasted “incorporeal immor-
tality” no longer crave the pleasures of earthly life (Introduction to Commen-
tary to Sanhedrin 10), some nevertheless do, according to Maimonides, make 
the deliberate choice to serve God on earth.
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